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Abstract 
This paper attempts to determine whether the adoption of recommended corporate 
governance practices by Chinese firms is associated with less earnings management 
proxied by abnormal accruals.  We examine the role of the audit committee and 
ownership concentration in preventing earnings management using Chinese firms 
listed in Hong Kong. The results of this preliminary analysis show that the frequency 
of audit committee meetings is associated with reduced levels of abnormal accruals, 
our measure of earnings management. We conclude that audit committee activity is an 
important factor in constraining the propensity of managers to engage in earnings 
management. In contrast, we find that the size of the audit committee is associated 
with increased levels of abnormal accruals and suggest that increasing the size of the 
audit committee creates information asymmetry between the audit committee and 
management that reduces the monitoring capacity of the audit committee. We do not 
find any association between audit committee independence, financial and industry 
experience, or ownership concentration and abnormal accruals. 
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1. Introduction 
The growth of the Chinese economy has attracted significant international 
investment interest. Foreign direct investment in China increased 46% in the first half 
of 2008 injecting $52.4 billion in investment during the six-month period1.  In order 
to protect their investment interest in Chinese firms, foreign institutional investors 
demand a transparent and efficient corporate governance system. However, in the past, 
China has been criticised for a lack of an effective corporate governance system (Shi 
and Drake, 2002; Tian, 2002; Clarke, 2003; Dahya, Karbhari, Xiao and Yang, 2003). 
In response to the criticism from the investors, the Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) has published a number of regulations and recommendations on 
corporate governance for Chinese listed firms2
Central to the debate on good corporate governance, is the way managers 
present earnings figures to the investing public and the usefulness of these figures for 
investors in determining equity values.  The purpose of this paper is to determine if 
the regulations and recommendations have been effective in improving the quality of 
reported earnings. In particular, we are concerned with the impact of audit committees 
and ownership concentration on managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings. The 
CSRC, following the issue of the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed 
. Subsequent to the regulations and 
recommendations issued by CSRC, there is some evidence showing that Chinese 
firms are actively moving towards improving corporate governance practices, such as 
establishing independent boards, audit committees and hiring competent board 
members with financial and industrial experience (Li, Sun and Liu, 2006, Cheung, 
Jiang, Limpaphayom and Lu, 2008).   
                                                 
1 Government data released by the Ministry of Commerce, China, July 4 2008. 
2 Publications include: the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China (2001), the 
Recommendation for the Institution of Independent Directors in Listed Companies (2001) and the 
Regulations on Information Disclosure of Listed Companies (2007). 
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Companies in China (2001), recommends firms set up an audit committee to 
discharge their responsibilities3
Research suggests that the incentives to manipulate earnings in Chinese listed 
firms are different to those in western firms (Chen and Yuan, 2004; Ding, Zhang and 
Zhang, 2007; Lau, 2004; Liu and Lu, 2007; Yu, Du and Sun, 2006). Yu et al. (2006) 
and Ding et al. (2007) state that Chinese firms are keen to meet regulatory 
requirements to raise capital due to privatising State Owned Enterprises (SOE). Liu 
and Lu (2007, p.883) suggests two motives for earnings management: (1) a listed 
company manages earnings to avoid being de-listed; and (2) a listed company 
manages earnings to exceed certain return on equity (ROE) thresholds to earn the 
right to issue additional shares to existing shareholders.  Thus, there are strong 
incentives to manage earnings while market-based governance controls and minority 
shareholder protection is weak in China.   Governance mechanisms used by Western 
firms, such as monitoring from blockholders
.  There is currently much debate about the role of the 
audit committee, as a vital internal corporate governance mechanism, in constraining 
earnings management.   
4, takeovers5, and management stock 
ownership6
                                                 
3  According to Paragraph 54, CSRC, (2001) the main duties of the audit committee are (1) to 
recommend the engagement or replacement of the company's external auditing institutions; (2) to 
review the internal audit system and its execution; (3) to oversee the interaction between the company's 
internal and external auditing institutions; (4) to inspect the company's financial information and its 
disclosure; and (5) to monitor the company's internal control system. 
4 There are a very small number of institutional owners in China. 
5 Hostile takeovers are rare as the State has a controlling interest in the majority of listed firms and their 
shares are not publicly traded.  
6 Top executives own a very small proportion of outstanding shares, typically around 1% (Liu and Lu 
(2007). 
, are rare or ineffective in Chinese firms.  The first research question of 
this paper is whether an audit committee can curb earnings management in Chinese 
listed firms?  Even though the Chinese listed firms follow the recommendations from 
the CSRC, there is a dearth of research on the effectiveness of audit committees on 
curbing earnings management. We operationalise our study using a sample of Chinese 
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firms listed in Hong Kong. These firms are in a better position to adhere to 
recommended corporate governance practices that follow the Code of Conduct in 
China. 
Prior U.S. research finds a significant association between institutional 
ownership concentration and earnings management (see for example, Charitou,  
Lambertides, and Trigeorgis, 2007).  However, given the level of State-ownership 
concentration in Chinese firms, the second research question is, can institutional 
investors play an effective role in constraining earnings management? There is a lack 
of research showing a significant impact of institutional ownership on earnings 
management in China.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways.  In an emerging market, 
the implementation of governance recommendations on the quality of earnings 
information is likely to have a measurable impact on the market as a consequence of 
the change in the regulatory environment.  As the Chinese market moves from 
virtually no governance regulation to significant regulations, it provides an ideal 
setting for observing the incremental impact of increased governance on the 
information environment.  Changing ownership concentration as firms transform from 
state owned enterprises to listed companies also provides a unique setting for 
investigating the impact on earnings management.  The results of our study provide 
preliminary support for an association between the role of audit committees and 
earnings management and raise the question of the role of ownership concentration. 
In an investigation of the impact of audit committees on earnings quality, we 
find a significant decrease in abnormal accruals, our measure of earnings management, 
when the audit committee meets more frequently, which implies an improvement in 
earnings quality.  In contrast, we find a positive association between the size of the 
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audit committee and abnormal accruals.  Taken together our results suggest that 
smaller audit committees that meet frequently are more effective in reducing earnings 
management.   We failed to find a significant association between audit committee 
independence or competence and abnormal accruals.  We also failed to find a 
significant association between State or institutional ownership concentration and 
abnormal accruals.  However, the small sample size has possibly contributed to the 
lack of significant results. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two provides the 
institutional background with the literature reviewed in section three. Section four 
develops the hypotheses and section five provides the method. The results are 
presented in section six and concluding comments in section seven. 
 
2. Institutional Background and Literature Review 
From an institutional theory perspective, a good corporate governance system 
needs to incorporate social norms and political influences in the host country. China is 
currently labeled as a transitional economy (Hua, Miesing and Li, 2006; Li et al., 
2006). A transitional economy is an economy which is changing from a centrally 
planned economy to a market orientated economy. The transition process is usually 
characterised by: changing and creating institutions, particularly private enterprises; 
changes in the role of the State, thereby, the creation of fundamentally different 
government institutions; and, the promotion of privately-owned enterprises, markets 
and independent financial institutions (Bennett, Estrin and Urga, 2007).  During the 
transition, the focus in China has been the rationalisation of the ownership structure 
and the development of a practical corporate governance system which is suitable for 
the Chinese institutional setting. The political and economic systems, as well as the 
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characteristics of the listed firms in China are important in constructing corporate 
governance and constraining earnings management in China. 
In western countries, Latin American and some Asian counties (excluding 
China), listed firms are mainly held by individuals, wealthy families, and financial 
institutions (Morck and Steier, 2005). The government does not have controlling 
shareholdings in firms. In many listed firms, incorporation separates management 
from ownership. However, the separation is not straightforward in China.  Even with 
the recent partial privatisation in State Owned Enterprises (SOE) by government, the 
State still has a controlling stake in the majority of publicly listed firms.   Liu and Lu 
(2007) suggest that State controlling ownership creates conflicts of interest with other 
shareholders. From the States’ perspective, a listed firm’s objective is not only wealth 
maximisation but may also include maintenance of urban employment, control of 
important industries and politically motivated job placement. Consequently, the 
governance problem in China is complex and multi-level (Clarke, 2003). The State 
dominates the board and often possesses the right to appoint the CEO as a proxy for 
government intervention in the firms.  A multi-level agency relationship evolves with 
the State playing the dual roles of a controlling shareholder and the regulator (Clarke, 
2003 and Firth, Fung and Rui, 2006). 
Research on the association between corporate governance controls and 
earnings management in Chinese listed firms includes the role of the board (Firth, 
Fung and Rui, 2007; Lai, 2005; Lai and Tam, 2007; Liu and Lu, 2007; Zhang and Li, 
2007) and ownership concentration (Liu and Lu, 2007; Ding et al 2007; Firth et al., 
2007). This paper considers the role of two important governance controls in 
constraining earnings management: an internal control mechanism, the audit 
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committee which has received little attention in research on Chinese firms, and 
ownership concentration, an external control.  
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
3.1 Audit committee effectiveness 
According to agency theory, the board has an oversight role of monitoring 
managers.  The board delegates some oversight duties to committees including the 
audit committee.  The role of the audit committee, as a governance mechanism, is to 
reduce information asymmetry between stakeholders and managers, thereby 
mitigating agency problems.  Audit committee oversight includes financial reporting, 
internal controls to assess risk, and auditor activity (DeZoort, Hermanson, 
Archambeault and Reed, 2002).  To fulfill the oversight role, the audit committee 
must be an effective monitor, thus giving rise to the recent governance 
recommendations and regulations.  From an agency-perspective, an effective audit 
committee fulfils its oversight role when it is independent of management, has a level 
of financial and industrial experience to carry out its duties, and actively monitors 
internal controls and financial reporting (Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein and Neal, 
2006).   
The monitoring role of the audit committee is important in China due to weak 
legal protection where minority shareholders are subject to the expropriation by the 
dominant shareholders, such as the State.  Country characteristics explain much more 
of the variance in governance than the firm level features (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; 
Doidge, et al., 2007). The political and economic systems, as well as the 
characteristics of the listed firms in China are important in considering corporate 
governance practices and their effect on earnings management in China.   
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At the end of April, 2007, 90 percent of the total listed companies on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges completed the reforms that made all the 
non-tradable shares tradable shares. This reform paves the road for the future 
privatisation of the remaining shares held directly and indirectly by the State. Yeung 
(2006) suggests that the change and continuity in the business society in China have 
led to the evolution of corporate governance in China.  From an institutional theory 
perspective, the changes in Chinese corporate governance may encourage firms to 
adopt recommended governance practices to compete for global capital. 
Research on the role of the audit committee in Chinese firms finds that Chinese 
listed firms voluntarily disclose information about the audit committee (Qu and Leung, 
2006) but the audit committee has no significant effect on firm performance (Wei, 
2007).  Lin, Xiao and Tang (2008) find that various stakeholders (investor/creditor, 
independent director, company officer and auditor) perceive the audit committee as a 
ceremonial decoration acting to lift the image of good corporate governance.  
Prior research on the association between the audit committee and earnings 
management in China is limited to publications in the Chinese language and has 
produced mixed results (Liu and Ma, 2008; Zheng and Liu, 2008). Related Asian 
research finds that audit committees play a significant role in constraining earnings 
management in firms in Hong Kong (Jaggi and Leung, 2007), Korea (Choi, Jeon, and 
Park, 2004), Singapore (Van der Zahn and Tower, 2004) and Malaysia (Bradbury, 
Mak and Tan, 2006).  
The scant and mixed result on the effectiveness of the audit committee in 
constraining earnings management in Chinese firms provides motivation for further 
research on the impact of audit committees. The following section develops 
hypotheses based on four important attributes of an audit committee (independence, 
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competence, activity and size) and the association with earnings management for 
Chinese listed firms.  
 
3.2 Audit committee independence  
Independence of audit committee members has been the focus of most of the 
audit committee research but has provided conflicting results. For example, U.S. 
research, Chtourou, Bedard and Courteau (2001) and Klein (2002) find that the 
proportion of independent directors is negatively associated with earnings 
management while Lin et al. (2006) do not find a significant association. Bradbury, 
Mak and Tan (2006) find that for firms in Singapore and Malaysia both board size 
and audit committee independence are related to lower abnormal working capital 
accruals. Rahman and Ali (2006) find no significant relationship between audit 
committee independence and earnings management in Malaysian firms. Research by 
Muniandy (2007) suggests that auditors’ assessment of the inherent risk of Malaysian 
firms is moderated by the independence of the audit committee.  Hence, different 
institutional settings provide the impetus and justification for further investigation in 
different settings.  
Research published in China has also provided mixed results.  Zha (2006) finds 
that the presence and size of the audit committee has a positive impact on increasing 
earnings quality while audit committee independence has no significant impact7
                                                 
7 The research uses the sample of firms from 2002 to 2004, immediately after the issue of the Code of 
Conduct by the CSRC.   
.  In 
contrast, Zheng and Liu (2008) show that the presence of an audit committee and 
audit committee independence are negatively associated with the magnitude of 
earnings management. Liu and Ma (2008) find that the association between the 
existence of an audit committee and earnings management is not evident in 2004 but 
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is significant in 20058. The difference between empirical results in 2004 and 2005 
may be due to the changes in the institutional environment9
Hypothesis 1a: There is a negative association between audit committee 
independence and earnings management for Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong.    
.    
We suggest that the effectiveness of the audit committee will improve over time. 
Further, the State Council published a Provision for Internal Auditing Management in 
Federal SOEs (October 2004, Chinese Version), requiring SOE to set up an 
independent audit committee under the board of directors in compliance with Code of 
Conduct for listed firms and internal control mechanisms. Therefore, as the State is 
influential in determining compliance with the corporate governance code in China 
(Chambers, 2005) and has increased the emphasis on the role of the audit committee, 
an independent audit committee is likely to constrain earnings management.  As 
alternative governance controls and minority shareholder protection is weak in China, 
an increase in representation by independent directors on the audit committee is more 
likely to contribute to effective overall monitoring of Chinese firms listed in Hong 
Kong.  The current study attempts to shed light on whether independent directors are 
effective in reducing earnings management. The preceding discussion leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
According to Chambers (2005), the responsibilities of audit committees in 
China are broadly similar to the U.K. although the market and the regulator are more 
closely aligned with the State.  Subsequently the State is more influential in 
                                                 
8 Zheng and Liu (2008) use data only from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  The Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange is the listing house for the entrepreneurs firms and it is rather small compared to the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange. In contrast, Liu and Ma (2008) examine all the firms from the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Exchanges, thus providing a plausible explanation for the difference in their findings.  
9 In 2004, 43.24 percent of firms listed on the stock exchange had an audit committee while 52.63 
percent of firms had an audit committee in 2005.   
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determining compliance with the corporate governance code. Research also shows 
that senior management in Chinese listed firms maintains close political relations with 
the monitoring agent (the State) (Xu, Zhu and Lin , 2005). Fan, Wong and Zhang, 
(2007) find that approximately 25 percent of CEOs are previously, or currently, 
government officers. They also find that some middle-level management officers are 
directly transferred from being government officers with no professional corporate 
background. Thus, the individuals charged with management are delegated from the 
State and are therefore not independent from the State. As government officers are not 
independent of the State they have incentives to serve the controlling shareholder 
interests (the State) rather than the interests of the minority shareholders. Hence, the 
monitoring power of the independent audit committee is even more important in the 
presence of government officers on the audit committee.   
Hypothesis 1b: The negative association between audit committee 
independence and earnings management will be weaker if government officers are 
members of the audit committee.    
 
3.3 Audit committee competence 
Given certain agency problems, when monitoring is difficult, firms may 
substitute or add to monitoring controls. Choosing the appropriate portfolio of control 
mechanisms requires considering the implications of the firm economic and 
institutional environment and the likelihood of potential agency costs. Subsequently, 
in a transitional economy, such as China, it is important that the audit committee has 
members with a level of accounting, financial and industrial competence that supports 
the monitoring role of the board.  Carcello, Hermanson and Neal (2006) using U.S. 
data, find empirical evidence that accounting and certain types of non-accounting 
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financial expertise reduce earnings management for firms with weak alternate 
corporate governance mechanisms.  This implies that audit committee’s financial 
expertise is a supplement to other corporate governance mechanisms in constraining 
earnings management. 
Prior research findings suggest that audit committee members’ financial 
sophistication may be an important factor in constraining managers from engaging in 
earnings management. U.S. research finds that audit committee financial expertise is 
negatively associated with earnings management (Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau, 
2004; Carcello et al., 2006; Chtourou et al., 2001; Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi, 2006; 
Xie, Davidson and DaDalt, 2003). While  Choi, Jeon and Park (2004) find that the 
competency of the audit committee is associated with the earnings management of 
Korean firms10
Governance recommendations, such as the Blue Ribbon report, argue that audit 
committee members should be financially sophisticated (Xie, et al., 2003). An audit 
committee, without financially sophisticated members may be largely ceremonial as 
suggested by Lin et al. (2008).  In this paper, it is anticipated that committee members’ 
financial (accounting, finance, Big4) and industrial experience is associated with audit 
committee’s ability to detect earnings management and complements the monitoring 
role of the independent audit committee.   There is no prior research examining the 
financial and industry expertise of the audit committee of Chinese listed firms.  This 
leads to the second hypothesis: 
.  
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative association between audit committee 
competence and earnings management for Chinese listed firms.   
 
                                                 
10 Competencies include the presence of professors of accounting or the employees of financial 
institutions on the committee.   
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3.4 Audit committee activity 
The audit committee members need to be active to perform their duty. No 
matter how independent or financially sophisticated an audit committee member is, if 
s/he is not actively taking part in the meeting or assuming the responsibilities as a 
audit committee member, s/he cannot effectively monitor the use of accruals. The 
number of audit committee meetings is the only publicly available quantitative signal 
about the diligence of audit committees, and regulators have emphasised the need for 
frequent meetings of the audit committee (Raghunandan and Rama, 2007). When 
investigating the association between U.S. firm characteristics and the number of 
audit committee meetings Raghunandan and Rama (2007) find that there are more 
audit committee meetings in large firms, firms that have high outsider block-holdings, 
firms in litigious industries, or firms with more board meetings.  
Prior U.S. research finds that the more active audit committees are the more 
effective monitors of earnings management (Chtourou et al. 2001; Xie et al., 2003) 
and restatements (Abbott, Parker, and Peters, 2004).  Conversely, Lin et al. (2006), 
Yang and Krishnan (2005) and Bédard et al. (2004) find no significant association. 
We suggest that audit committee activity is likely to impact audit committee 
effectiveness and subsequently limit earnings management.  The preceding discussion 
leads to the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative association between audit committee activity 
and earnings management for Chinese listed firms.   
 
3.5 Audit committee size  
Research has considered the size of the board as an important governance 
characteristic, although results are inconclusive on whether it is better to have smaller 
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or larger boards (see for example, Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand, 1999; 
Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells, 1998; and Yermack, 1996).  The scant research on 
the importance of the size of the audit committee has also produced mixed results.  
Xie (2003) and Abbott et al. (2004) find that the size of the audit committee is not 
significantly related to earnings management. Yang and Krishnan (2005) and Lin et al. 
(2006) find that audit committee size is negatively associated with earnings 
management.  In China, Zha (2006) finds that the size of the audit committee has a 
positive impact on increasing earnings quality.   
A smaller audit committee may be more effective at as it may be less 
encumbered with bureaucratic problems. Hence, smaller audit committees may 
provide better financial reporting oversight. Alternately, a larger audit committee may 
be able to draw from a broader range of experience. If so, a larger audit committee 
might be better at preventing earnings management.  Consequently no direction is 
predicted for the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The size of the audit committee is associated with earnings 
management for Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong. 
 
3.6 Ownership concentration  
A central governance issue is the degree of ownership concentration which is a 
distinctive characteristic of Chinese listed firms, with approximately two-thirds of 
issued shares being held directly or indirectly by the State. Concentrated ownership 
impacts the level of information asymmetry between managers and investors and 
provides incentives to manage earnings (Fan and Wong, 2002; Firth et al., 2007; 
Donnelly and Lynch, 2002).  Fan and Wong (2002) find that concentrated ownership 
in East-Asian firms creates agency conflicts between controlling owners and outside 
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investors so that controlling owners manage earnings for self-interested purposes and 
to prevent leakage of proprietary information about the firms' rent-seeking activities. 
More recently, Liu and Lu’s (2007) results suggest that agency conflicts between 
controlling shareholders and minority investors account for a significant portion of 
earnings management in China's listed firms.   
The privatisation of SOE offers institutional investors a means for pursuing 
investment opportunities in an emerging market. However, as the State still has a 
controlling stake in most of the publicly listed firms, the shareholdings of the 
institutional investors are relatively small compared with the controlling shareholders, 
the Chinese government. Therefore, the research question is whether different types 
of ownership concentration are associated with earnings management.  
State ownership.  Prior research, examining the association between State-
ownership and corporate performance, has produced conflicting results. Xu and Wang 
(1999), Qi, Wu and Zhang, (2000), Sun and Tong (2003), and Wang (2003) report a 
significant and negative association between State-ownership concentration and firm 
performance. While, Wei (2008) finds that there is only a significant and negative 
impact on company performance when State-ownership is above 50 percent.  Tian 
(2001) finds a U-shaped relationship; corporate value decreases with increases in 
State ownership when the State is a small shareholder; and increases when the State 
equity holding is large. In contrast, Sun and Tong (2002), and Ma and Wei (2004) 
report an inverted U-shaped relationship between State-ownership concentration and 
corporate performance.   
Research examining the association between State-owned shareholding and 
earnings management is scant and also mixed.  Firth et al., (2007) find that State-
ownership concentration is positively associated with discretionary accruals at the 10 
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percent level while other research has found a non-linear association.  Ding et al 
(2007) find that at lower levels of State-ownership there is a positive association with 
earnings management and a negative association at high levels of ownership.   
As the dominant shareholder, the government impacts the rights of other 
shareholders in corporate governance, which contradicts market-oriented norms of 
corporate governance.  The government dominates the board through their controlling 
ownership and can appoint directors, managers and supervisory directors.   As noted 
earlier, the government may emphasise political objectives and/or social welfare 
objectives rather than wealth maximisation. Further, individual politicians have their 
own goals, such as maximising their political base. Therefore, politicians may 
deliberately transfer funds to support them politically through the control rights of 
state-owned shares (Wei, 2008).   In addition, state-controlled firms may manipulate 
earnings to hide the expropriation of funds11
There is an agency problem associated with identifying the principal or residual 
risk bearer when a government agent is a shareholder.  This makes it difficult to 
motivate directors and managers of listed companies because they do not hold the 
absolute ownership of these assets
 for financing IPO requirements and to 
achieve a higher IPO price for their subsidiaries (Ding et al., 2007).  Therefore, when 
State-ownership concentration is high, the conflict of interest between the State and 
minority shareholders is greater and the incentives to increase earnings management 
are stronger.   
12
                                                 
11  Ding et al (2007) suggest that the parent company may siphon valuable assets into its listed 
subsidiary in order to boost earnings and may absorb unprofitable units from the listed company prior 
to listing. 
12  There is an extra agency relationship in state-owned companies compared to privately-owned 
companies, as the controlling owners are themselves agents of the true owners: the state. 
 
.   Furthermore, with the increased privatisation of 
Chinese listed firms and as the percentage of non-state owned shares increases, the 
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incentive to expropriate funds declines.  As a result, when State-ownership 
concentration is low, there is less conflict of interest between the State and minority 
shareholders, and lower incentives to manipulate earnings.   
Foreign and domestic institutional investors. Theoretically, institutional 
investors have more wealth and resources to gather more informative and relevant 
information than individual investors through their substantial shareholdings 
(Jiambalvo et al. 2002). In doing so, the sophisticated institutional investors are able 
to monitor the firms’ operation and deter managers from taking actions to harm the 
firm’s long-term development strategies. However, others argue that short-term 
institutional shareholdings may encourage managers to manipulate the accounting 
figures to meet or beat earnings targets to obtain short-term profit (Bushee, 1998).   
Prior research suggests that financial institutions play a limited role in 
monitoring the governance of listed firms in China, mainly due to the “concentrated 
state ownership, an immature regulatory environment, inadequate transparency and 
disclosure of financial information, and weak corporate governance within financial 
institutions themselves” (Yuan, 2008).  However, this study was conducted in 2003 
when there were fewer mutual funds and securities companies.  It is therefore 
important to empirically test the role both foreign and domestic institutional investors 
play in the quality of earnings and consequently the effectiveness of the recent 
regulatory reforms. 
A company may commit to providing higher quality earnings to induce foreign 
investors to invest. In addition, foreign investors will put pressure on companies to 
improve the quality of their accounting information to protect their investment. 
Collectively, both foreign and domestic institutional investors may be able to exert 
pressure on a company to improve the quality of the financial statements. We expect 
18 October 2010 17 
that the higher the collective share ownership of institutional investors the lower will 
be earnings management.  Firth et al., (2007) find that the presence of foreign 
shareholders is negatively associated with discretionary accruals, their measure of 
earnings management, at the 10 percent level.  However, they do not test the level of 
ownership of foreign investors.   
A study on corporate governance would be incomplete without considering the 
impact of ownership on the incentives to disclose earnings information, particularly in 
a country such as China with evolving and unique ownership characteristics.  Given 
the conflicting results and the recent governance reforms in China it is important to 
test whether different types of ownership concentration are associated with earnings 
management.  The following hypothesis is proposed. 
Hypothesis 5:  Ownership concentration is associated with earnings 
management in Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong.  
 
4. Research design  
4.1 Sample and data 
This research uses a sample of the top 50 firms listed in Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange in 2007 to carry out a pilot study. China has successfully listed the leading 
firms 13 on the Hong Kong Stock Exchanges (HKEX) since the 1990s. By listing 
shares overseas, the Chinese firms can raise capital for expansion and improve 
corporate governance by adopting the developed markets’ Code of Conduct. The 
majority of large H-share Chinese firms14
                                                 
13 These leading firms are the largest banks, insurance companies, telecomm companies and large 
industrial companies. Please refer to the Table 1 on Appendix.  The majority of these firms are also 
listed in Chinese mainland market, i.e. the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  
14 H-shares are shares of listed firms that are incorporated in the People's Republic of China and 
approved by the China Securities Regulatory Commission for a listing in Hong Kong. 
 are also listed on the Stock Exchanges of 
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Mainland China. Listing Chinese firms in Hong Kong can be interpreted as a part of 
Chinese government’s initiatives to privatise State Owned Enterprises (SOE).   
Compared with the Chinese Stock Exchanges, the HKEX is a relatively 
developed and mature market15. As a result of close geography and culture, it was 
convenient for China to develop a code of corporate governance and other listed 
regulations based on the Hong Kong experience. As a past colony of Great Britain, 
Hong Kong maintains its close link with Anglo-Saxon countries 16
 There are three main research designs for testing earnings management: (1) 
those based on aggregate accruals, (2) those based on specific accruals and (3) those 
based on the distribution of earnings (McNichols, 2000). According to McNichols’s 
. Certainly, the 
Hong Kong security regulators learnt a lot from Anglo-Saxon style corporate 
governance mechanisms to develop its code of corporate governance conduct (see for 
example, Jaggi and Leung, 2007). 
The sample of listed H-share firms are the blue-chip companies in China. To 
clarify, they are the counterparts of Citic Bank, Exxon Mobil and IBM in the U.S. and 
are the representatives of corporate China. The reasons why these companies are 
selected for this pilot study are: 1) The Chinese government supports the H-share 
firms’ corporate governance reforms and anticipates improved performance. 2) Due to 
the importance and financial strength of these H-share firms, it is argued that these 
firms are in a better position to have a recommended corporate governance system 
following the Code of Conduct in China.  
 
4.2 Method 
                                                 
15  Hong Kong surpasses New York in IPOs, International Herald Tribune, 25-12 -2006. 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/12/25/business/borse.php 
16 Hong Kong was a colony of the U.K. from 1842 to 1997. The Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX) was 
established under the U.K. regime in 1891. Hong Kong has a completely different political and economical system 
to mainland China and maintains a high degree of self-governing; even after the handover to China in 1997.  
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statistics from top eight accounting journals, the first method is used most. The 
commonly used Jones model and modified Jones model are based on aggregate 
accruals. The specific accrual approach can utilise researchers’ accounting knowledge 
to test particular area of accruals in different institutional settings.  
Total accruals can be split into expected and abnormal (non-discretionary and 
discretionary accruals) accruals. Abnormal accruals can be manipulated by 
management by using professional judgment in their accounting choices. Therefore, 
abnormal accruals models are often used in detecting earnings management so that 
abnormal accruals and earnings management are associated in the literature (Kothari, 
2001).  
Abnormal accruals are used for a measurement of earnings management by 
many previous researchers (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995, Guay, Kothari and 
Watts, 1996, Kasznik 1999, Bartov, Gul and Tsui, 2000, and Kothari, 2001). There 
are several models applied to calculate abnormal accruals. However, the modified 
Jones models have been used extensively in previous research for measurement of 
earnings management.  Following Jones (1991), DeFond and Jiambalvo, (1994) and 
Butler, Leone and Willenborg (2004), we use the modified Jones model from Butler 
et al. (2004) as a proxy for earnings management.  We also use variations of this 
model in testing the robustness of our results.   
 
Total Accruals/AT06 = α0 + α1 (∆Rev07/AT06) + α2 (PPE07/AT06) + ε                               
(3) 
 
Where: total accruals is calculated by adding earnings before extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations minus operating cash flows from continuing 
operations and then divided by total assets (2006).  ∆Rev07 is the change in revenue 
between 2006 and 2007 divided by total assets (2006).  PPE07 is the net property, 
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plant and equipment (2006) divided by total assets (2006). Total accruals are 
separated into expected accruals and abnormal accruals17
ACINDS: Number of audit committee directors with industrial experience divided by 
the number of directors on the audit committee 
.   
 The following model is developed to test the hypotheses.  Separate regressions 
are run for audit committee characteristics and ownership concentration to test the 
association with the dependent variable, abnormal accruals, ABAC.  
ABAC =  α0 + α1ACIND + α2ACACC + α3ACFIN + α4ACBIG4 + α5ACINDS + 
α6ACM + α7ACSIZE + α8LEV + α9ROA + α10BM + e        (1) 
ABAC =  α0 + α1STATE + α2FOREIGN + α3NONP + α4LEV + α5ROA + α6BM 
+ e        (2) 
Where: 
Dependent Variable:  
ABAC: the measure of abnormal accruals is the residuals from running the regression 
of equation (3),  
Independent Variables: 
ACIND: Number of independent directors divided by total number of directors on the 
audit committee. 
ACACC: Number of audit committee directors with accounting experience divided 
by the number of directors on the audit committee. 
ACFIN: Number of audit committee directors with financial experience divided by 
the number of directors on the audit committee. 
ACBIG4: Number of audit committee directors with big4 experience divided by the 
number of directors on the audit committee. 
                                                 
17 Some other papers use the terms discretionary and non-discretionary accruals for expected and abnormal accruals.  
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ACM: Number of audit committee meetings held annually 
ACSIZE: Number of directors on the audit committee.. 
STATE: Number of shares held by the state divided by the total issued share. 
FOREIGN: Number of shares held by the foreign institutional investors divided by 
the total issued share. 
NONP: Number of shares held by the non-parent institutional shareholders (foreign 
and domestic) divided by the total issued share 
Control variables:  
LEV07:  (Long term debt + debt in current liabilities) / total assets 
ROA07: Return on asset 07 from Mint Global. It is calculated as earnings before 
interest and extraordinary income divided by total assets.  
BM07: Book to market value 07. It is calculated by the net asset divided market 
capitalisation.  
 
4.3 Control variables 
In addition to the experimental variables we use prior research to identify and 
control for other factors that are likely to motivate managers to manipulate earnings. 
Leverage (LEV): A firm’s leverage ratio influences both risk management and accrual 
management (Smith and Stulz, 1985).  As managers may manage earnings to avoid 
debt covenant violations (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994) we would 
expect a positive association with abnormal accruals.  We predict that the coefficient 
will be positive. Book-to-market-ratio (BM): It is easier for fast growing firms to 
engage in earnings manipulation than it is for mature firms since it is difficult to 
observe the business activities of fast growing firms. Further, firms growing rapidly 
may have internal control problems (Kinney and McDaniel, 1989). Companies with 
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high growth rates may have problems operating efficient audit committees and this 
might exacerbate the practice of earnings management. Firm performance (ROA): 
Managers that perform poorly are likely to use (discretionary) accruals to manipulate 
earnings due to the threat of dismissal. Return on assets is included as a control 
variable as it is expected that firms with lower performance tend to manipulate 
earnings figures and this should be positively associated with earnings management. 
We predict that the coefficient of ROA will be negative. 
 
5. Results and discussion  
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 for the sample of 46 firms18
                                                 
18 Following tests of normality, 4 firms with extreme values for ABAC were dropped from the sample. 
. 
Descriptive statistics for audit committee characteristics reveal that the audit 
committee consists of an average of 3.6 members (minimum 3; maximum 7) with 83 
percent of the members classified as independent (minimum 50 percent; maximum 
100 percent).  The audit committee meets on average 3 times per year (minimum 2; 
maximum 9).  Forty-three percent of the firms report 100 percent audit committee 
independence (refer to Figure 1).   However, additional analysis reveals that 31 firms 
(67.4 percent) have at least 1 government officer on the audit committee. The 
percentage of the audit committee members who are government officer is, on 
average, 27.7 percent (minimum 0; maximum 100 percent).  Consequently, although 
they are classified as “independent” members of the board, their alliance is more 
likely to be with the State, a substantial shareholder of the firm. The characteristics of 
the audit committee reveal that the average of members of the audit committee with 
accounting expertise (ACACC) is 34.3 percent, financial expertise (ACFIN) is 35.8 
percent and Big4 experience (ACBIG4) is 4 percent.  
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Descriptive statistics for the ownership variables indicate that the State-
controlling ownership (STATE) percentage is on average 58 percent of issued shares 
(minimum 22 percent; maximum 86 percent).  The percentage of issued shares for 
foreign institutional investors (FOREIGN) is on average 12 percent of issued shares 
(minimum 0; maximum 55 percent). The average for all institutional investors, both 
foreign and domestic (NONP), is 14.7 percent of issued shares (minimum 0; 
maximum 55 percent).   
Insert Table 1 here 
 
The Pearson’s Correlation Matrix presented in Table 2 demonstrates that the 
only significant correlations with the dependent variable, abnormal accruals, are the 
control variables, leverage and board size. This result suggests that that a firm with a 
larger board is less likely to manipulate earnings which is contrary to the finding in 
Yermack, (1996) and Karamanou and Vafeas (2005). The control variable, leverage, 
is positively and significantly correlated with abnormal accruals, implying that firms 
with higher debt levels are more likely to manipulate their earnings to avoid violation 
of their debt covenants. While there are several statistically significant correlations 
between some of the explanatory variables, none of them are highly correlated.  
Insert Table 2 here 
 
Table 3 reports the results of testing the association between the audit 
committee characteristics and abnormal accruals, our measure of earnings 
management (H1-4)19
                                                 
19 Tests for multicollinearity are run simultaneously with each regression. Variance inflation factors are 
within acceptable levels in all cases (< 2) and are subsequently not reported in the Tables. 
. The model used in Table 3 (Panel A) explains 18 percent of 
the variability in abnormal accruals.  The results of testing H1(a) suggest that there is 
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no significant association between audit committee independence and earnings 
management (B = 0.044; p = 0.255). Although 98% of the firms in our sample follow 
the recommendation of the CSRC to have an audit committee with a majority of 
independent directors (see Figure 1), the association of audit committee independence 
and earnings management is ambiguous. This result suggests that simply following 
the code of conduct provided by the regulators cannot guarantee a reduction in 
earnings management given the high concentration of ownership in a jurisdiction like 
China (Park and Shin, 2004). To test H1(b) and further investigate the reported 
“independence” of the audit committee, we split the sample into firms that have a 
government officer on the audit committee (N=31) and firms that do not (N=15) and 
report the results in Table 3 (Panel C). Although, the small sample size means we 
cannot confidently evaluate the results, they do provide preliminary evidence that the 
audit committee is only influential in constraining earnings management where there 
are no government officials on the audit committee. This model explains 44 percent of 
the variability in abnormal accruals, our measure of earnings management. 
The results of testing H2 are reported in Table 3 (Panel A) and show that there 
is no significant association between audit committee financial or industry expertise 
and abnormal accruals. To provide a deeper analysis of H2, we conducted a principal 
components factor analysis to create a new variable, FACTOR SCORE, which 
incorporates the combined effects of accounting, financial, Big4 and industry 
experience. The regression results on the Factor Score show that the joint effects of 
various audit committee members’ expertise is not significantly associated with 
abnormal accruals (B = -0.005; p = 0.354) and thus H2 is not supported. 
Table 3 (Panel A) also shows the results of testing H3. Based on our result, 
there is a significantly negative association between audit committee activity and 
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earnings management (B = -0.007; p = 0.048). This result suggests that increasing the 
number of audit committee meetings a year will help effective utilisation of resources 
to detect earnings management (Menon and Williams, 1994, Beasley et al., 2000, 
Dhaliwal et al, 2006). The average number of audit committee meetings of the 
sampled firms is slightly more than three, which is less than the recommended 
threshold of four audit committee meeting each year (Abbott et al. 2004 and Carcello 
et al. 2002, and Dhaliwal et al, 2006). Their recommendations are based on the Blue 
Ribbon Committee (1999). Therefore, we advocate an increase in audit committee 
meetings by Chinese listed firms to improve their monitoring of management.  
The testing of H4, also reported in Table 3, shows the effect of audit 
committee size and finds that this variable is positively and significantly associated 
with earnings management (B = 0.014; p = 0.040).  Audit committee size has received 
little attention in previous research; however, the positive association implies that 
larger audit committees are less efficient in monitoring earnings manipulation by 
management.  This result conflicts with Yang and Krishnan (2005) and Lin et al. 
(2006) who find that audit committee size is negatively associated with earnings 
management. However this finding is consistent with the argument on board size and 
accruals suggested by Yermack (1996) and Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) who 
suggest that a large board is less efficient and flexible. 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
Table 4 reports the results of testing the association between ownership 
concentration and abnormal accruals H5.  The model explains 10 percent of the 
variation in abnormal accruals and there is no significant association between 
ownership concentration and earnings management in Chinese firms listed in Hong 
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Kong (State: B = 0.056; p = 0.307; foreign institutional: B = 0.033; p = 0.852; or total 
institutional: B = 0.018; p = 0.925).  We further tested the association between 
ownership concentration and abnormal accruals by including board characteristics 
(size and independence) in the model. However, the results remained insignificant. 
Insert Table 4 here 
6. Sensitivity Analysis 
To determine the impact of ownership and firm size on the association 
between audit committee characteristics and abnormal accruals, alternative 
specifications of the model are tested and reported in Table 5. First we split the 
sample on the median of State ownership (59.28 percent). The variable, Factor Score, 
measuring audit committee members’ accounting, financial and big4 experience, is 
negatively and significantly associated with abnormal accruals for the firms with a 
higher level of state ownership (B = -0.014; p = 0.064).  In addition audit committee 
activity is negatively and significantly associated with abnormal accruals for the firms 
with a lower level of state ownership (B = -0.009; p = 0.077).    This result indicates 
that audit committee financial or industry experience is important in detecting 
earnings management when the State has a controlling interest in the firm. In contrast, 
audit committee activity is only effective when State ownership is at lower levels. 
 Splitting the sample on the median of foreign institutional ownership (12.34 
percent) reveals that the coefficient on audit committee size is positive (0.084) and 
only significant at the 10 percent level (p = 0.084). This result supports our result in 
the main model that larger audit committees are less efficient in monitoring the use of 
accruals and may suggest that foreign ownership weakens that association as they 
monitor the earnings figure to protect their investment.   
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Finally, we attempt to determine if the size of the firm is a contributing factor 
to our results.  Table 5 illustrates the effect of splitting the sample at the median of 
total assets.  The model using the larger firms in the sample explains 35.1 percent of 
the variability in the model.  Consistent with the results of the main model, the size of 
the audit committee is positively and significantly associated with abnormal accruals 
but for large firms only (B = 0.019; p = 0.064). However, the coefficient on audit 
committee independence is in the opposite direction to that predicted.  This result 
needs further investigation using a larger sample size.  Firm size does not seem to be a 
contributing factor for explaining the association between audit committee activity 
and abnormal accruals as the association remains significant regardless of firm size. 
Throughout the analysis, the variable, leverage, is positively and significantly 
associated with abnormal accruals.  This result indicates that more highly leveraged 
firms are more prone to earnings management.  However, splitting the sample at the 
median for leverage did not alter the results.  In addition we used variations on the 
modified Jones model as the dependent variable and the results remained consistent 
although the explanatory power of the models declined. 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper extends the research on the corporate governance practices of 
transitional economies by examining audit committee characteristics and ownership 
concentration of Chinese firms listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. These firms 
are in a better position to adhere to recommended corporate governance practices that 
follow the Code of Conduct in China. The objectives of this study are twofold.  First, 
to determine whether the characteristics of an audit committee that complies with 
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governance practices recommended by the CSRC are associated with earnings 
management, proxied by abnormal accruals.   The second objective is to determine 
whether State and institutional investor ownership concentration have an impact on 
earnings management.   
The results of this preliminary study show that increasing the frequency of 
audit committee meetings is associated with reduced levels of abnormal accruals 
while increasing the size of the audit committee is associated with increased levels of 
abnormal accruals. We suggest that smaller audit committees that meet frequently are 
more effective in reducing earnings management.  We do not find any direct 
association between audit committee independence, financial and industry experience, 
or ownership concentration and abnormal accruals.  However, additional analysis 
reveals that government officers on the audit committee, State and foreign 
institutional ownership levels, and firm size impact the effectiveness of the audit 
committee in constraining earnings management.  The strength of these results may 
be improved by increasing the sample size. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (N=46)        
                    
          
  ABAC ACIND ACSIZE ACM ACACC ACFIN ACBIG4 ACINDS GOV 
Mean -0.006 0.832 3.630 3.280 0.343 0.358 0.040 0.297 0.277 
Median -0.007 0.817 3.000 3.000 0.333 0.333 0.000 0.333 0.292 
SD 0.040 0.171 0.997 1.601 0.236 0.276 0.105 0.251 0.251 
Minimum -0.094 0.500 3.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 0.085 1.000 7.000 9.000 1.000 1.000 0.330 1.000 1.000 
          
 STATE FOREIGN NONP ROA07 BM07 LEV07    AT07 BDSIZE BDIND 
Mean 0.583 0.122 0.147 0.100 0.822 0.134 93285 10.960 0.365 
Median 0.593 0.123 0.144 0.080 0.660 0.099 30387 11.000 0.357 
SD 0.120 0.095 0.094 0.052 0.553 0.123 190123 2.440 0.084 
Minimum 0.224 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.169 0.000 3644 6.000 0.167 
Maximum 0.863 0.548 0.554 0.226 3.293 0.399 1060131 18.000 0.571 
 
 
ABAC: Abnormal accruals. ACIND: Proportion of independent directors to total directors on the audit committee. ACSIZE: Number of directors on the audit committee. ACM: Number of audit 
committee meeting annually. ACACC: Proportion of directors with accounting experience on the audit committee.  ACFIN: Proportion of directors with financial experience on the audit committee.  
ACBIG4: Proportion of directors with big4 experience on the audit committee. ACINDS: Proportion of directors with industrial experience on the audit committee. GOV: Proportion of directors on the 
audit committee who are also government officials. STATE: Proportion of state’s shareholdings to total issued shares. FOREIGN: Proportion of foreign institutional investor’s shareholdings to total 
issued shares. NONP: Proportion of non-parent shareholdings (foreign + domestic institutional ownership) to total issued shares. ROA07: Return on asset 07.. BM07: Book to market value 07. LEV07:  
(Long term debt + debt in current liabilities) / total assets. AT07: Total assets in million RMB.  BDSIZE:  Number of directors on the board. BDIND: Proportion of independent directors to total 
directors on the board.    
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Table 2: Pearson Correlation Coefficients (N = 46) 
  
                          
  
  ABAC  AC SIZE ACM 
AC 
IND AC ACC ACFIN 
AC 
BIG4 AC INDS STATE FOREIGN  NONP ROA07 BM07 LEV07 
LOG 
AT07 
BD 
SIZE 
BD 
IND 
ABAC  1.000                 
ACSIZE 0.213 1.000                
ACM -0.170 0.039 1.000               
ACIND -0.091 -.375** 0.071 1.000              
ACACC 0.070 -0.220 -0.002 -0.159 1.000             
ACFIN -0.142 -0.229 -0.110 -0.083 0.224 1.000            
ACBIG4 -0.029 -0.139 0.020 0.107 0.201 0.114 1.000           
ACINDS 0.058 0.121 -0.099 -0.103 -0.118 -0.017 -.365** 1.000          
STATE 0.123 -0.167 -0.169 0.052 -0.045 0.099 0.035 -0.039 1.000         
FOREIGN  0.158 -0.046 -0.202 -0.198 0.067 -0.039 0.198 -0.244 -0.128 1.000        
NONP -0.048 .350** .391* -0.002 -0.032 -0.029 0.003 0.004 -.422*** -0.210 1.000       
ROA07 -0.222 -0.018 -0.032 0.177 -0.025 0.081 0.202 0.111 0.130 -0.270 -0.126 1.000      
BM07 0.038 -0.211 -0.059 0.178 -0.082 -0.106 -0.179 -0.054 -0.054 -0.061 -0.026 -0.207 1.000     
LEV07 .419*** -0.087 0.195 -0.119 0.121 -0.258* 0.202 -0.204 -0.028 0.091 0.054 -.317** 0.129 1.000    
LOGAT07 -0.005 -0.044 .319** 0.030 -0.206 -.340** 0.107 -0.068 .332** -.396* 0.186 0.064 0.011 .421*** 1.000   
BDSIZE -0.263* 0.130 0.015  -0.067  0.193 -.351**  -0.203  0.238 -.363**   -0.166  0.225 0.048 0.149 0.032  0.105 1.000   
BDIND 0.244 -.627*** 0.073 -0.065 0.010 -0.099 0.151 0.220 -0.115 0.144 0.199 -0.088 -0.083 -0.236 0.049 -0.105 1.000 
                  
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).    
ABAC: Abnormal accruals. ACM: Number of audit committee meeting annually. ACSIZE: Number of directors on the audit committee.  ACIND: Proportion of independent directors to total directors on the audit committee. 
ACACC: Proportion of directors with accounting experience on the audit committee.  ACFIN: Proportion of directors with financial experience on the audit committee.  ACBIG4: Proportion of directors with big4 experience 
on the audit committee. ACINDS: Proportion of directors with industrial experience on the audit committee. STATE: Proportion of state’s shareholdings to total issued shares. FOREIGN: Proportion of foreign institutional 
investor’s shareholdings to total issued shares. NONP: Proportion of non-parent shareholdings to total issued shares. ROA07: Return on asset 07. BM07: Book to market value 07. LEV07:  (Long term debt + debt in current 
liabilities) / total assets. LOGAT07: Natural log of total assets in million RMB.  BDSIZE:  Number of directors on the board. BDIND: Proportion of independent directors to total directors on the board.   
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Table 3: Regression results for audit committee characteristics.   
Dependent Variable: Abnormal accruals (N=46) 
                                            (Panel A) (Panel B) (Panel C) 
   
 AC with government 
officers (N=31) 
AC without government 
officers (N=15) 
  Beta t         Beta 
 
t         Beta 
 
t         Beta 
 
t 
(Constant) -0.099 -1.726* -0.067   -1.512 -.097 -1.569 0.097    1.118 
ACIND 0.044 1.157 0.033     0.954 0.047   0.869 -0.019    -0.514 
ACACC 0.021 0.849       
ACFIN 0.007 0.319       
ACBIG4  -0.030 -0.481       
ACINDS 0.018 0.746       
FACTOR¹   -0.005  -0.938 -0.006  -0.642 -0.001    -0.209 
ACM -0.007 -2.047** -0.007     -2.122** -0.004  -0.768 -0.012       -3.054** 
ACSIZE 0.014    2.135** 0.012      2.042** 0.013    1.744* -0.016     -0.806 
LEV07 0.175     3.268*** 0.173       3.519*** 0.219       2.955*** 0.116      1.843 
BM07 -0.001 -0.126 -0.003  -0.252 -0.008  -0.405 0.003      0.330 
ROA07 -0.068 -0.576 -0.065  -0.591 -0.037  -0.202 -0.158     -1.398 
Adjusted R2    0.179     0.223                         0.161                           0.442 
F statistic     1.981*        2.847**                         1.822                           2.586 
*** p ≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10 
 
ACIND: Proportion of independent directors to total directors on the audit committee. ACACC: Proportion of directors with accounting experience on the audit committee.  
ACFIN: Proportion of directors with financial experience on the audit committee.  ACBIG4: Proportion of directors with big4 experience on the audit committee. ACINDS: 
Proportion of directors with industrial experience on the audit committee. FACTOR: Factor score of audit committee members' accounting, financial and big4 experience is 
created by using principle components factor analysis. ACM: Number of audit committee meeting annually. ACSIZE: Number of directors on the audit committee. LEV07:  
(Long term debt + debt in current liabilities) / total assets. BM07: Book to market value 07. ROA07: Return on asset 07. 
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Table 4: Regression results for ownership concentration.   
Dependent Variable: Abnormal accruals (N=46)  
  Beta t         Beta    t 
(Constant) -0.054         -1.243 -0.022     -0.275 
STATE 0.056          1.035 0.028      0.493 
FOREIGN 0.033          0.188 0.004      0.022 
NONP 0.018          0.095 0.028      0.148 
LEV07 0.125          2.575*** 0.127         2.618*** 
BM07 0.000         -0.090 0.002      0.214 
ROA07 -0.068         -0.553 -0.048     -0.389 
BDSIZE    -0.003     -0.950 
BDIND    0.040      0.456 
Adjusted R2         0.100   0.112 
F statistic         1.832   1.707 
*** p ≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10 
 
STATE: Proportion of state’s shareholdings to total issued shares. FOREIGN: Proportion of foreign institutional investor’s 
shareholdings to total issued shares. NONP: Proportion of non-parent shareholdings to total issued shares. LEV07:  (Long term 
debt + debt in current liabilities) / total assets. BM07: Book to market value 07. ROA07: Return on asset 07.  BDSIZE:  Number 
of directors on the board. BDIND: Proportion of independent directors to total directors on the board.   
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Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis.  
 
Dependent Variable: Abnormal accruals       
   
STATE   
OWNERSHIP 
 ≥ MEDIAN  
59.28% (N=23) 
STATE  
OWNERSHIP < 
MEDIAN 59.28% 
(N=23) 
FOREIGN 
INSTITUTIONAL 
OWNERSHIP ≥ 
MEDIAN 12.34% 
(N=23) 
FOREIGN 
INSTITUTIONAL 
OWNERSHIP < 
MEDIAN 12.34% 
(N=23) 
TOTAL ASSET ≥ 
MEDIAN 30,387 
MILLION RMB (N=23) 
TOTAL ASSET < 
MEDIAN 30,387 
MILLION RMB (N=23) 
  Beta t Beta t Beta t Beta t Beta     t Beta t 
(Constant) -0.141    -1.485 -0.036 -0.488 -0.065 -1.206 -0.109 -1.155 -0.130   -2.004* -0.003     -0.057 
ACIND 0.063     1.037 0.037  0.638 0.033   0.670 0.043 0.702 0.093    1.814* -0.018     -0.433 
FACTOR 
SCORE¹ -0.014   -1.998* 0.006  0.578 -0.006  -0.547 -0.010 -1.052 -0.009   -0.931 -0.006     -0.958 
ACM -0.001   -0.190 -0.009 -1.900* -0.008  -1.466 -0.005 -0.855 -0.010   -1.886* -0.008     -1.805* 
ACSIZE 0.019    1.253 0.012  1.450 0.012   1.852* 0.017 1.145 0.019    2.001* 0.011      1.520 
LEV 0.225    3.051*** 0.123  1.561 0.225   2.560** 0.127 1.199 0.223    2.888*** 0.255      2.754** 
BM07 0.004    0.342 -0.014 -0.640 -0.004  -0.341 0.004 0.158 -0.036   -1.672 0.007      0.718 
ROA07 -0.112   -0.582 -0.189 -1.001 -0.085  -0.587 -0.014 -0.064 0.094    0.590 -0.318     -2.224** 
Adjusted R2     0.255   0.103    0.211  0.020    0.351       0.314 
F Statistic     2.074   1.362    1.839  1.063    2.702*       2.438* 
*** p ≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10 
       
   
ACIND: Proportion of independent directors to total directors on the audit committee. ACM: Number of audit committee meeting annually. ACSIZE: Number of directors on the 
audit committee.  FACTOR SCORE: Factor score of audit committee members' accounting, financial and big4 experience. STATE: Proportion of state’s shareholdings to total 
issued shares. FOREIGN: Proportion of foreign institutional investor’s shareholdings to total issued shares. NONP: Proportion of non-parent shareholdings to total issued shares. 
LEV07:  (Long term debt + debt in current liabilities) / total assets. BM07: Book to market value 07. ROA07: Return on asset 07. 
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Figure 1: Proportion of audit committee independence 
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